With their categorical support for the United States during the Iraqi crisis, the post-communist countries put in evidence a big break on the Old continent, between pacifist and neutralist Western Europe and pro-Atlantic East Europe. Why did they run the risk of provoking the anger and fury of its "western godfathers" by supporting the United States, in spite of the reserves on the policies of the current conservative administration in Washington?

The explanations of moral order or the consequentive questions are pointless. Post-communist Europe indeed already chose, by opting for the community and the western institutions, namely NATO and EC. As for the Iraqi crisis, the dilemma between Germany and the United States has nothing to do with the simplistic and moralizing plan of the Good against the Evil: it is especially about two opposite strategic visions, structured according to different interests but both relatively justifiable.

The position of East Europe in favour of the United States is pragmatic and results from the long-term strategic interests of the post-communist countries. This position is based on the postulate that the unity and the efficiency of the Euro-Atlantic community requires an active involvement of the United States, indispensable in the equation of the European security.

After the fall of the communist regimes in 1989, the East European societies were affected with painful social, economic and institutional alterations characterized notably by very grave problems of security. The fragility of the new institutional and democratic systems, the painful transition towards unsatisfactory market economies and criminalized privatization, representation and efficiency of the national institutions, inter-ethnic conflicts, all this incited oriental Europe to turn to the West.

But the West Europe did not move. After "the adoption" of East Germany, reunited Germany and its European partners put back the in the East undated extension buffer, abandoning East Europeans to themselves. The refusal of the integration and the absence of efforts similar to those of the plan Marshal was followed in the 90s by the inability of the EC to contain the ethnic conflicts in which got stuck in the mud the states of ex-Yugoslavia.

In brief, the strong involvement of the United States in the European policy turned out to be essential if post-communist Europe wished to resolve its complex problems connected to the transition and the security. The implication of the United States and the NATO in Bosnia allowed the Dayton agreements. The decision of the administration Clinton to support the eastward extension of NATO was the consolation after the postponement of the extension of the EC. The post-communist countries incorporated the real politic that the only rational way of finding a solution to their difficulties related to security passed by the United States commitment and the transatlantic community.

But the priority which these countries tune to the conservation and to the development of the transatlantic partnership does not ensue strictly from the current context of transition towards the democracy, the market economy and the institutional efficiency. Central and oriental Europe is a region which the initiatives of major powers made unstable and vulnerable during centuries.

The Cold war had frozen in the East the divisions and the traditional conflicts. The presence of the United States in the balance of the European security, through the NATO for example, created an unique occasion to turn the back in the inheritance of the conflicts between the main European protagonists, namely France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Even if the idea according to which Europe is enough mature to protect its unity and the peace all on one's own, without the United States, even if this idea is acceptable in the circles of the anti-American left and those of the Gaullist right-hand side in the Western Europe, it is not it still in the former communist countries. Contemporary Poland keeps a lively recollection of the neighborhood with Germany and Russia. Today, NATO and the United States are factors independent from the Polish security which guarantee that Poland will never be destroyed and divided by its powerful neighbours. A similar guarantee is offered by the United States, always by the intervention of the NATO, in the Baltic States, in the Czech Republic, in Hungary, in Rumania and in Bulgaria. In the Bulgarian case, NATO represents an essential factor both for the regional balance and for the national security.

The Iraqi crisis allowed certain anti-American circles in Europe and the anti-European and the other conservatives in the United States to express their doubts on the transatlantic future of the partnership and the cooperation in security. Because the risks of destruction or loss of direction of the transatlantic cooperation are important and several aspects of the question cannot be the object of this article, the more modest purpose of which is to formulate the real stakes for central and oriental Europe connected with the decline of the Atlantic Alliance.

The first consequence of a destruction of the transatlantic cooperation would be the fast and considerable increase of the influence of Russia in post-communist Europe. The geopolitical game of the 19th century, that of "major powers", would begin again and big France, big Russia and maybe big and today peaceful Germany would again try to manipulate the fate of the smallest and more vulnerable European countries, distributed in spheres of influence. Certainly, the EC gives sufficient guarantees in terms of social and economic development, but it is not the case in the field of the security. This because the foreign and common security policy has never exceeded the good intentions and does not succeed in melting the national interests of the big States of the EC - which are the former major powers. That's why the strategy of long-term development of the post-communist countries includes simultaneously and with the same degree of priority two essential objectives: member future of the NATO and the member of the EC. The crisis and the possible destruction of the NATO will modify certainly the perspectives of European integration of these countries. Instead of entering the club dreamed about the free and prosperous nations, they risk to adhere to another club, that of the satellites associated to the closest European power.

The support of the former communist countries of the Eastern Europe for the United States must not be interpreted as an act of obsequiousness, quite as it is not a question of agreeing altogether on the overall policy led by the conservative administration in place to Washington. This support must be understood as the expression of the long-term fundamental national interests, shared by all the post-communist European countries, based on the protection at all costs of the euro-Atlantic space and the dominating role of the United States. It explains the paradox of the Eastern Europe which, in cooperation with Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom, lined up beside Washington - by using the same arguments as France and Germany which refused the support...

The multilateralism in the international relations, bases of which are the partnership and the responsibility shared between States, stays a leading value for the Eastern Europe. That is why the unilateralism practised by the United States at present cannot be of use as platform to a long-term partnership with the "short story" ("piece of news") Europe, quite as he could not make it with the "old woman" Europe.

The differences of positions between the American conservatives and the former communist countries are substantial and inevitable, in particular as regards the criteria of the appeal to the force. Recently, the administration Bush appreciably revised these criteria in the decline, especially after the events of September 11th, 2001. The history of the Eastern Europe is crossed by bloody conflicts and by attacks, and the use of the force to resolve crises was there mostly fatal... What moves closer to the former communist countries of the vision of the Western Europe which is that of a policy of mutual interdependence, contrary to a competitive vision which advocates the direct appeal to the force.

By supporting the United States, the former communist countries of the Eastern Europe chose the partner whose capacities suited most, in the context, to their interests. It is not the President Bush, but indeed the British Prime Minister Tony Blair who took the immense risk of going against the opinion of his own party and who played his brilliant political career, and it to defend a political vision in a moment of break between Europe and the United States. For him, the transatlantic partnership and the European integration are two objectives of the same importance as we would not know how to realize separately. Even if Blair tries to promote the British national interests, he also defends the western unity for the future. The east Europeans have the same vision and the same objectives. The question is to know if they will realize them. After 1989, the idea which determined the policy of the post-communist countries was to follow closely the West. Today, it is not any more for the agenda and the West is not any more the same.

Now, the most essential question is the setting up of new active and coherent policy which builds Atlantic Europe and which opposes to the revival of retrograde and reactionary Europe of Big Powers. The Atlantic cause is not lost. One day new capable governments will arrive in Berlin and Washington and will resume the transatlantic cooperation and will grant it a well-balanced and rational importance. Western Europe is divided itself on the future of the Euro-Atlantic relations. The position of the new democracies could thus turn out decisive and arouse a new effort to protect and rethink the Atlantic Alliance - the most successful alliance in the history - and to anticipate the challenges which our common future will prepare.